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TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST REDUCTION CASE STUDY: 
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touch-labor and improve production process yield (percentage of manufactured items that 
are defect-free) of SPY-1B/D phase shifters, and will review programs that improved 
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and six sigma, productivity improvement projects, etc.  This case study was conducted 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. AEGIS BACKGROUND 
 AEGIS (named after the mythological armor shield of Zeus), is the Navy’s most 
capable surface-launched missile system ever put to sea.  State-of-the-art radar, missile-
launching systems, computer programs, and displays are fully integrated to work in 
concert to detect incoming missile or aircraft threats, sort them by assigning a threat 
value, assign on-board Standard surface-to-air missiles, and guide them to their targets.  
This makes the AEGIS system the first fully integrated combat system capable of 
simultaneous warfare against air, surface, subsurface and strike threats.  Anti-air warfare 
elements include the Radar System AN/SPY-1, Command and Decision System, and 
Weapons Control System.  AEGIS can track up to 100 targets at any time (Figure 1). 
 
                
Figure 1.   Radar Panels 
Note: The radar panels are flat structures, mounted to give the ship 360-degrees of coverage.  
(Source: From Van Genderen, undated)   
 
 For many years, the US Navy has developed systems to protect itself from 
attacks.  Since the end of World War II, several generations of anti-ship missiles have 
emerged as threats.  The threat posed by such weapons was confirmed in April 1988, 
when two Iranian surface combatants fired on US Navy ships in the Persian Gulf.  The 
resulting exchange of anti-ship missiles led to the destruction of an Iranian frigate and 
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corvette by US-built Harpoon missiles.  Modern anti-ship missiles can be launched from 
several hundred miles away, and the attacks can be coordinated—combining air, surface 
and subsurface launches so missiles arrive on-target almost simultaneously.  
The US Navy's defense against this threat has continued to rely on the winning 
strategy of defense-in-depth.  Guns on Navy ships were replaced in the late fifties by the 
first generation of guided missiles.  By the late sixties, these missiles continued to 
perform well, but the DoD recognized that reaction time, firepower, and operational 
availability in all environments did not measure up to the potential threat.  To counter 
this, an operational requirement for an Advanced Surface Missile System (ASMS) was 
promulgated, and a comprehensive engineering development program was initiated to 
meet that requirement.  ASMS was re-named AEGIS in December 1969 (Jane's.com, 
2006).  In 1974, the USS NORTON SOUND (AVM 1) was fitted with the AEGIS 
Engineering Development Model (EDM-1), including one SPY-1 Phased-array Radar.  
The power and effectiveness of AEGIS was demonstrated on May 17, 1974, when the 
AEGIS Weapon System, manned by the crew of NORTON SOUND, successfully 
detected, tracked, engaged, and intercepted a BQM-34A Target on the Pacific Missile 
Test Range with the first firing of the Standard-1 Missile.  Later, a second non-warhead 
Standard-1 Missile was fired and physically intercepted and destroyed the target at a 
range of 15 miles.  Rear Admiral Wayne E. Meyer, AEGIS/SM-2/AEGIS Ship 
Acquisition Manager (considered "Father of AEGIS") termed this performance "A 7 
league advance in our Navy's ability to go once more in harms way" (USS NORTON 
SOUND, 2006). 
After success with the EDM-1 shipboard application, the decision was made to 
construct the first AEGIS ships based on the hull and machinery designs of Spruance 
class destroyers.  The sophistication and complexity of the AEGIS combat system were 
such that the combination of engineering with AEGIS ship acquisition demanded “special 
management treatment.”  This combination was affected by the establishment of the 
AEGIS shipbuilding project at the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA PMS-400) 
in 1977 (Jane's.com, 2006).  The special management treatment combined the structured 
hull mechanical and electrical systems, combat systems, computer programs, repair parts, 
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personnel maintenance documentation, and tactical operation documentation into one 
unified organization to create the highly capable, multi-mission surface combatants that 
are today's AEGIS cruisers and destroyers.  The charter for NAVSEA PMS-400 
represented a significant Navy management decision, one which had far-reaching impacts 
on acquisition management, design, and lifecycle support of modern Navy ships.  For the 
first time in the history of surface combatants, PMS-400 introduced an organization that 
had both responsibility and authority to simultaneously manage development, acquisition, 
systems integration, and lifecycle support.  
 Originally identified as a guided missile destroyer, the DDG-47 class was re-
designated a guided missile cruiser.  The first ship of the class, USS TICONDEROGA 
CG-47, was commissioned on January 23, 1983.  CG-52 opened a new era in surface 
warfare as the first AEGIS ship with the Vertical Launching System (VLS), allowing 
greater missile selection, firepower and survivability.  The improved AN/SPY-1B radar 
went to sea in CG-59 through CG-73, ushering in another advance in AEGIS capabilities.   
 Advances in technology throughout the 1980s made it possible to build an AEGIS 
system with a smaller ship while maintaining multi-mission capabilities.  The smaller 
ship was designed using an improved sea-keeping hull form, reduced infra-red and radar 
cross-section and upgrades to the AEGIS Combat System such as the SPY-1D.  The first 
ship of the DDG-51 class, USS ARLEIGH BURKE, was commissioned on July 4, 1991.  
The DDG-51 class was named after a living person, the legendary ADM Arleigh Burke, 
the most famous destroyerman of World War II (Jane's.com, 2006).  DDG-51s were 
constructed in flights, allowing technological advances during construction.  Flight II, 
introduced in FY1992, incorporated improvements to the SPY radar and the Standard 
missile, active electronic countermeasures, and communications.  Flight IIA (Figure 2), 
introduced in FY1994, added a helicopter hangar with one anti-submarine helicopter and 
one armed attack helicopter.     
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Figure 2.   USS OSCAR AUSTIN (DDG 79). 
Note: This is the First Flight IIA, commissioned August 2000  
(Source: From Global Security.org, 2006) 
 
Although DDG-51s were constructed in flights, the combat systems are upgraded in 
baselines.  The baselines are described as follows:  
x Baseline 2: Vertical Launching System, Tomahawk Weapon System, and 
Anti-submarine Warfare upgrades.  
x Baseline 3: AN/SPY-1B radar and AN/UYQ-21 consoles.  
x Baseline 4: Integration of AN/SPY-1D radar and AN/UYK-43/44 
computers with superset computer programs developed for DDG-51 class.  
x Baseline 5: Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, Command and 
Control Processor, Tactical Data Information Link 16 and Information Exchange 
System, and AEGIS Extended-range Missile.  
x Baseline 6: First combat systems operating system run via local area 
networks that integrate AEGIS legacy equipment with commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) technology.  COTS technology actually controls all primary processors 
instead of only using COTS for backup/secondary processing.  
x Baseline 7: Latest AEGIS upgrade (September 2005) includes a new 
radar, AN/SPY-1D(V), which has enhanced electronic countermeasures and 
increased capability in littoral environments.  Baseline 7 is based on COTS 
computer architecture (Naval-Technology.com, 2006). 
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 To date, AEGIS Weapon System capabilities have been installed on 76 US Navy 
cruisers and destroyers.  Plans are currently underway to install the system on an 
additional 13 Destroyers.  The SPY-1D(V) littoral radar upgrade superseded the SPY-1D 
in new-construction ships beginning in FY 1998 and first deployed in 2005.  AEGIS is 
the primary naval weapon system for Japan, and is part of two European ship 
construction programs—the Spanish F-100 and the Norwegian New Frigate.  
Additionally, Australia and the Republic of Korea recently selected AEGIS for its newest 
platforms (Lockheed Martin, 2006). 
B. PRINCIPLES OF PHASED-ARRAY RADAR ANTENNAS  
Electronically scanned antennas have broad applicability for both commercial and 
military applications, including advanced military radars, cellular base stations, satellite 
communications, and automotive anti-collision radar.  There are many benefits to 
electronically scanned antennas, including fast scanning, the ability to host multiple 
antenna beams on the same array, and the elimination of mechanical complexity and 
reliability issues.  Because phased-array radar antennas require no physical movement 
(Figure 3), the beam can scan at thousands of degrees per second, fast enough to irradiate 








Figure 3.   Spy-1D Phased-array Radar Antennas (2 of 4 shown) 
(Source: After Global Security.org, 2006) 
 
 A SPY-1 Phased-array Radar Antenna consists of 4500 elements that are 
essentially miniature individual antennas.  These elements are arrayed in patterns 
depending on the desired performance characteristics needed by the application, such as 
operating frequencies, antenna gain, sensitivity, and power requirements.  Each of these 
elements requires a phase shifter (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4.   Drawing of a Spy-1B/D Phase Shifter  
(Source: Used with Permission from Lockheed Martin, 2006) 
 
 Beams are formed by shifting the phase of the signal emitted from each radiating 
element to provide constructive/destructive interference so as to steer the beams in the 
desired direction.  In Figure 5, both radiating elements are fed with the same phase.  In 
Figure 6, both elements are fed with different phases. The signal achieves maximum gain 
by constructive interference in the main direction.  The beam sharpness is improved by 
the destructive interference. 
    
                                                  
Figure 5.   Two Elements Fed with the Same Phase   
(Source: From Radar Tutorial, 2006) 
 
                                           
 
Figure 6.   Two Elements Fed with Different Phases   
(Source: From Radar Tutorial, 2006) 
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C. ANATOMY OF AN AEGIS RADAR PHASE SHIFTER 
        
                     
    
Figure 7.   Cross-section of a Phase Shifter Assembly   
(Source: Used with Permission from Lockheed Martin, 2006) 
 
x Phase Shifter Assembly operates as a waveguide 
o Wave is launched into cavity from center pin of SMA connector 
o Aluminum housing establishes waveguide cavity 
o Phase shifter and faceplate form the radiating element for the antenna 
x Voltage is applied to latch wire to change phase 
o Magnetic field from latch wire current establishes magnetic dipole within 
ferrite  
o Magnetic field strength is proportional to latch-wire current 
o Traveling wave interacts with dipole moment in ferrite, changing the 
wave’s effective phase 
o Each phase shifter has a phase slope and temperature compensation 
resistor attached, which compensate for individual performance 
x Phased-array antenna beam is steered by controlling phase of 
 transmitted wave at each radiating element 
 
 
SMA Connector Pin Latch Wire 
RF Wave Housing Iris 
Garnet Core 
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D. TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST (TOC)  
 Readiness is a critical parameter of all Department of Defense (DoD) weapon 
systems.  If a system is not ready, its performance characteristics are of no use.  Each 
weapon system has an expected readiness rate that must be maintained for national 
security.  Readiness can be achieved by building highly reliable weapon systems or, if the 
systems are not highly reliable, by supporting them with an extensive logistics system 
that can ensure spare parts and other support items are available as needed.  In essence, 
the cost of a product’s readiness is the cost to develop, produce, operate and maintain that 
system.  For example, in 2001, the total cost for the AEGIS Weapons System was at 
$42.7 billion, the predominant cost driver being operations and support (O&S) at $22.2 
billion (Jane's.com, 2006). 
 Traditionally, development and production (acquisition costs) have accounted for 
about 28% of a weapon’s total ownership costs, while O&S costs account for about 72% 
(Figure 8).  For a number of years, the DoD’s goal has been to spend less on system 
support and more on development and procurement in order to modernize weapon 
systems.  But in fact, growth in operating and support costs has limited the DoD’s buying 
power.  DoD officials have cited shortages of spare parts and unreliable equipment as 
reasons for low mission-capable rates for some weapons.  As a result, some 
modernization has been postponed in order to pay high and unexpected O&S costs (US 
GAO, 2003, February). 
 
                            
Figure 8.   Nominal Lifecycle Cost of Typical DoD Acquisition Program with a 30-
 year Service Life (Source: From GAO, 2003, February) 
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 Total Ownership Cost has two definitions; the first is very broad, seen from the 
DoD or Service perspective.  The second definition is deliberately written from the 
vantage point of the program manager of a warfighting system.  For this discussion, the 
research will focus on the second definition:   
  
 Defense Systems TOC is defined as Life Cycle Cost (LCC).  LCC (per 
DOD 5000.4M) includes not only acquisition program direct costs, but 
also the indirect costs attributable to the acquisition program (i.e., costs 
that would not occur if the program did not exist).  For example, indirect 
costs would include the infrastructure that plans, manages, and executes a 
program over its full life and common support items and systems.  The 
responsibility of program managers in support of reducing DOD TOC is 
the continuous reduction of LCC for their systems. (Boudreau & Naegle, 
2003, September) 
 
 Pursuit of Total Ownership Cost reduction at the level of the warfighting system 
may be separated into two major approaches that are connected, end-to-end, along a 
lifecycle time line.  During the development phases, the effort or process is called Cost 
As an Independent Variable (CAIV).  For systems in the field or fleet, the process 
becomes Reduction of Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC).  Figure 9 is a typical depiction of 
the CAIV/R-TOC relationship (Kaye, Sobota, Graham & Gotwald, 2000). 
 
 
Figure 9.   CAIV/R-TOC Transition   





 The first approach, Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV), addresses Total 
Ownership Cost during the warfighting system's developmental phases, beginning with 
the Concept Refinement phase.  The focus of CAIV is to establish cost targets based on 
affordability and requirements and then to manage to those targets, thereby controlling 
TOC (Boudreau & Naegle, 2003). 
 The second approach, Reduction of Total Ownership Costs (R-TOC), focuses on 
the reduction of average procurement unit cost (APUC), and weapon system operating & 
support (O&S) costs.  R-TOC is employed as the warfighting system is produced and 
placed in service.  Examples of R-TOC would be a value engineering change proposal 
(VECP) to reduce the cost of manufacturing a component by improving the process yield 
or by reducing O&S costs by improving the reliability of an expensive system or 
component.  Although R-TOC initiatives are more effective when performed early in 
development, R-TOC can be effective throughout the system's lifecycle (Boudreau & 
Naegle, 2003). 
1. Cost Drivers 
 Operating and support costs may be dramatically reduced by identifying cost 
drivers and correcting them—often, but not always, through redesign.  The most efficient 
time to accomplish this is during the pre-acquisition and development phases while the 
system is only a paper design and may be changed relatively inexpensively.  However, 
acquisition cost drivers that are discovered during the production phase also may lead to 
redesign or other actions to reduce the APUC, or may reduce the cost of manufacturing 
by improving the process yield to save or avoid future expenditures. 
 Since Lockheed Martin had so much design success (phase shifters proven to be 
100% reliable, therefore, never requiring reliability metrics or O&S costs), the focus in 
this study will be on the latter—acquisition costs, namely: the design and redesign of the 
SPY-1 phase shifter (which dramatically improved performance without increasing the 
APUC), and the reduction of costs to manufacture SPY 1-B/D phase shifters by 
improving the process yield.  Additionally, this research will present various process-
improvement programs used to reduce "touch-labor" and improvements to programs that 
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affected phase-shifter production either directly or indirectly, i.e., consolidated 
purchasing, lean and six sigma, productivity improvement projects, etc.    
E.  CONTRACTING PROCESSES AND INFLUENCES 
1. Background 
 Contracting policy, processes and procedures can have significant and highly 
influential results on all types of programs.  Contracting and contract incentives have had 
influence over Government programs since the early 1900s.  One of the earliest 
appearances of the contract incentive was the arrangement utilized in the contract for the 
Wright Brothers’ aircraft.  The century saw many twists and turns in the form of changes 
in preferred contract type and use of incentives.  In the 1940’s, the Navy pushed to 
change most of its large ship, airframe and ordnance contracts from cost-reimbursable to 
fixed-price contracts.  This scenario was repeated throughout the realm of Government 
contracting to fit the policy of the day.  For example, in the 1950’s, the contract type that 
dominated the landscape was cost reimbursable to enable our defense base to push 
forward rapidly in technology to gain advantages over the Soviets.  In the 1960’s, in the 
face of increasingly growing numbers of contract overruns, budget pressures pushed the 
contracting communities away from cost-reimbursable contracting.  The fixed-price 
contracting arrangement was now again in vogue.  During this time, fixed-price 
arrangements failed to curtail cost overruns because, in many instances, the contractor 
assumed too much risk for the particular work being accomplished, and contracts had to 
eventually be altered to facilitate system delivery.  The fixed-price contract again fell into 
the realm of disuse until the 1980s.  In the 1990s, a deliberate reform movement worked 
to redefine the Government and contractor relationship.  A return to cost-reimbursement 
development contracts in order to more equitably balance risk with contract type where 
appropriate began during this period.  In addition, the use of fixed-price contracts for 
commercial items and other appropriate efforts was retained.  This shifting from one-
type-fits-all contracting to specific contract types being used appropriately resulted in 
contracts wherein the rewards were commensurate with the risks for the contractor and 
superior performance for the Government (Venable, 2000, December).  Finally, the 
federal procurement system underwent sweeping change and reform that included the 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act 
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(FARA).  These pieces of legislation revolutionized the federal procurement apparatus 
and promoted both innovation and the idea of the contracting officer functioning as a 
business advisor rather than just as a “speed bump” that enforced procurement regulation 
and statutes. 
 Throughout the century, contract policy and contract incentive use evolved and 
adapted to meet requirements and satisfy other Governmental policy objectives.  Some 
evolutions led to less-than-desirable results; others led to great examples for future 
successes to emulate.  Overall, these changes in contracting policies and processes 
contributed to the development of successful acquisition and contracting strategies that 
are still utilized in today’s weapon system programs and will most undoubtedly be used 
for future weapon systems. 
 Overall, with respect to contract type or contract incentive, while the program or 
contracting authority determines what contract type or incentive should be used, the PM 
must understand each method or process available and apply the applicable criteria for 
use.  The only way for a program to reap the benefits of any contract type or incentive is 
to use and apply them appropriately as they correspond to the program, program 
objective, requirements, contractor objectives, and other internal and external forces 
surrounding the decision-making environment. 
2. Acquisition and Contracting Contextual Framework 
 The natural prerequisite to using effective and appropriate contracting methods, 
types and incentives is to understand the different choices available to the contracting 
officer and their particular criteria for use.  This section will generally describe 
contracting types available to the contracting officer and incentives that could be used to 
promote superior contractor performance.  It will by no means include an exhaustive list 
of contract incentives or newer, more progressive and innovative incentives available for 
use today.  It will outline the basic contract incentives that have the potential to motivate 
contractors to improve performance with respect to cost, schedule, or delivery and 
include a history of use in Government contracting.  These incentives are also outlined in 




a. Contract Types 
  There are essentially two over-arching contract types available to the 
contracting officer.  On one end, there are cost-reimbursable contracts; on the other end 
of the spectrum is fixed-price contracts.  Cost-reimbursable contracts place maximum 
risk upon the Government because the contractor is only obliged to put forth its best 
effort and possibly may not even deliver the end product.  In addition, the Government 
pays all allocable, allowable, and reasonable costs associated with the effort and contract.  
Although these types of contracts include statutory limitations on fees paid to the 
contractor, there is no real motivating factor to influence the contractor to control costs.  
These types of contracts are generally reserved for efforts that are developmental and 
research driven in nature, or situations in which there is an increased amount of risk 
because of unknowns and unproven concepts or technologies. 
  The fixed-price contract type shifts most of the risk to the contractor 
performing the service or delivering the product.  This is because the contractor must 
deliver the product or service, and only the final negotiated price is paid (which may be 
less than costs incurred by the contractor).  However, there is no limit on the potential 
profit earned by the contractor, either, and the contractor can increase the profit yielded 
by lowering the costs incurred during performance of the contract.  These contract types 
are generally used on commercial and lower-risk or proven technology-driven 
requirements where risks are mostly known and manageable. 
b. Contract Incentives 
  The basic fundamental of incentive contracting is to direct contractor 
performance in the manner desired and to exceed minimum contract requirements in one 
or multiple performance attributes.  The two basic types of incentive methods used are 
formula-based incentives and award-fee incentives. 
  Formula-based incentives utilize cost and fee or profit-specific targets that 
correspond to a particular cost and savings sharing relationship between the Government 
and the contractor.  These targets and the ratio of costs or savings shared between the two 
parties determine the fee or profit benefit from contractor performance results.  Cost-
reimbursable incentive contracts or Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contracts have a 
minimum and maximum fee with no ceiling price due to the reimbursable nature of the 
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contract.  Fixed-price Incentive (FPI) contracts incorporate use of a ceiling price that 
could possibly lead the contractor to assume 100% of the cost responsibility when total 
price surpasses what is called the Point of Total Assumption (PTA).  This is the point at 
which every additional dollar spent by the contractor eliminates a dollar of potential 
profit.  This is the point at which the FPI reverts to a FFP contract.  Contracts that use the 
formula-based approach sometimes incorporate performance, schedule or even additional 
cost incentives to motivate the contractor to superior performance.  The performance 
characteristics of the contract and the contractor must be amenable to being objectively 
measured in order to ascertain the level at which the contractor was able to perform the 
contract requirements.   
  Award-fee contract arrangements can be characterized by flexibility, 
subjective evaluation of contractor performance, and administratively intensive contract 
management processes.  An award-fee contract, if cost-reimbursable, usually has a small 
base fee that establishes the minimum amount of fee available to the contractor for 
performing the contract.  In some cases, the base fee may be zero dollars, depending on 
the intention of the contract strategy.  In addition to the base fee, there is a maximum fee 
that a contractor can earn in an award-fee contract.  The difference between the two fees 
accounts for the award fee that is usually allocated for award to the contractor over a 
number of periods during the term of the contract. While the award-fee option offers 
some increased flexibility to the Government over formula-based incentive contracts, the 
major drawback is the significance of administration required to manage the contract and, 
specifically, to operate the award-fee decision mechanisms required like the PEB. 
c. Business and Management Issues  
  Other factors can significantly influence the success of any contract 
strategy.  Many programs have failed because the parties involved failed to recognize the 
interest of the other and, therefore, opportunities for mutual benefit and success.  
Divergent motivating factors between the parties can sabotage the ultimate goal of any 
incentives or contract arrangement and push the parties to pursue their own interests 
rather than the best interests of the program.  Arrangements in which both parties have a 
vested and shared interest in the success or failure of the program are more likely to work 
toward common goals and produce successful outcomes.  
 15
  Achievement of desired program results involves a conscious effort to 
balance a series of tradeoffs.  Accomplishment of this balance among the different 
tradeoffs depends on the effective translation of the program’s goals into an effective 
contract strategy.  Success will depend on both parties understanding the differing 
motivations at play and the level of balance developed in the incentive relationship 
between the two.  To attain balance, the correct incentives must be identified and 
communicated effectively to all parties.  The Government communicates to the contractor 
management through the actual contract, and the contractor management communicates 
the incentives and program goals to its employees through the organization.  The 
objective should be to engage the right incentives that will effectively motivate the 
contractor organization and each employee. 
F. ABOUT LOCKHEED MARTIN AT MOORESTOWN  
 Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMCO) is principally engaged in research, 
development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, 
products, and services.  The corporation serves customers worldwide in defense and 
commercial markets, with its principal customers being agencies of the US Government.  
With its corporate headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland, LMCO is organized into five 
business areas: Aeronautics, Electronic Systems, Information & Technology Services, 
Integrated Systems & Solutions, and Space Systems.  LMCO employs 135,000 personnel 
at 939 facilities worldwide, and achieved $37.2 billion in sales for 2005 (Figure 10).  
 Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors (MS2) in Moorestown, New 
Jersey, is part of the Electronic Systems business area which manages complex programs 
and provides integrated hardware and software solutions to ensure the mission readiness 
of armed forces and government agencies worldwide; this facility achieved $10.6 billion 
in sales for 2005.  The MS2 facility was established in 1953 as part of RCA Corporation 
and later merged with General Electric-Aerospace Group, was sold to Martin Marietta in 

























Figure 10.   Lockheed Martin Sales for 2005  
(Source: From Lockheed Martin, 2006) 
 
 LMCO-Moorestown is the prime contractor for manufacturing and integration of 
the Aegis Weapons System and Aegis Depot Operations for the Navy.  Its successful 
history in large-scale systems integration, radar technology, software development, 
microelectronics, lifetime support, vertical launching systems, and fire-control systems 
enabled the company to establish a solid foundation for creating future innovative 
solutions. 
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II. SPY-1A PHASE SHIFTER 
A. PHASE SHIFTER BACKGROUND 
 A phase shifter is a two-port device whose basic function is to provide a change in 
phase of RF signal with minimal attenuation.  Basically, there are two types of phase 
shifters: mechanical and electronic.  From the late 1940s up to the early 1960s, prior to 
the development of electronically variable phase shifters, all phase-shifting requirements 
including those of beam-steering array antennas were mostly met by mechanical phase 
shifters.  In 1957, Reggia and Spencer reported the first electronically variable ferrite 
phase shifter, which was employed in an operational phased array (Koul & Bhat, 1991).  
The 1960s saw the emergence of another important type of phase shifter—the 
semiconductor diode phase shifter.  Since then, significant advances have taken place in 
both ferrite and semiconductor diode phase shifters, resulting in a wide variety of 
practical devices.  Major growth of phase-shifter technology came from its known 
potential utility in phased arrays.   
 A typical phased array may have thousands of radiating elements, and with each 
antenna element connected to an electronically variable phase shifter, the array acquires 
the basic capability for inertia-less switching or scanning of the radiated beam with 
minimal time.  With this capacity, the array achieves complete flexibility to perform 
multiple functions in 3-D space, interlaced in time and even simultaneously. The 
evolution of phased-array technology to its present sophisticated form is strongly based 
on the development of electronically variable phase shifters.  In turn, new areas of 
application have opened up in radar, communication, and civilian sectors, demanding 
newer techniques and technologies for phase shifters.  In addition to ferrite and 
semiconductor diode phase shifters, several other types have emerged in recent years; 






B. THE BIG BREAKTHROUGH 
 Due to lack of electronic media available from the 1970s, and multiple corporate 
mergers (RCA/GE/Martin Marietta/Lockheed) spanning three decades, detailed 
engineering/production data of the AEGIS Weapons System transition from the EDM-1 
to the SPY-1A is virtually non-existent or not available.  Research relating to this effort is 
based on the recollections of current and retired production engineers and mangers from 
Lockheed Martin at Moorestown.  
 In the 1960s and ‘70s, ferrite phase shifters were preferred for the large phased-
array radars.  However, they were extremely expensive.  The first phase shifters used in 
EDM-1 were in the neighborhood of $2000 per unit in 1974 dollars.  One phased-array 
radar antenna requires 4500 phase shifters, and one AEGIS combatant requires four 
phased arrays, thus, totaling approximately $36 million in phase shifters alone.  In 2006 
dollars, this equates to approximately $148 million, clearly representing a significant cost 
for a single part in one system on a AEGIS equipped ship.  Although AEGIS was a huge 
leap in National Defense, RCA knew that ferrite phase shifters would have far-reaching 
effects on acquisition management, design, and lifecycle support of a modern navy. 
 In an effort to drive down AEGIS Weapons System costs, RCA embarked in a 2-3 
year effort to productize the phase shifter, that is, something that could be practically 
specified, repeatable, and producible.  This productization effort resulted in RCA 
designing its own version of the ferrite phase shifter for use in the next generation of 
SPY-1 Radars. 
 The phase shifter comprises a magnetic material toroid (shown in Figure 11) 
shape with integral dielectric inserts that is itself inserted into an extruded rectangular 
metal tube waveguide.  The magnetic toroid is a mixed oxide, ceramic-like material 
possessing ferromagnetic properties.  The phase shifter design was required to meet 
demanding electrical requirements to control the amplitude and phase of the radiated 
waveform at the antenna aperture to achieve a narrow radar beam with low antenna 
sidelobes at moderately high power. Selection of the materials comprising the phase 
shifter required extensive research and testing of available materials in the industry.  The 
requirement to be operational in a temperature between 140 and 160 degrees Fahrenheit 
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led to the decision to use a temperature-stabilized garnet rather than a ferrite; the latter is 
generally less expensive, but also less stable with temperature.   
                                
                                   
Figure 11.   Garnet Used in AN/SPY-1 Phased-array Phase Shifters 
(Source: Used with Permission from Lockheed Martin, 2006) 
 
 RCA was able to meet the cost objective to produce one phase shifter unit for 
approximately $200—a monumental effort considering it brought down the cost of one 
ship-set (18,000 units) from approximately $148 million to approximately $15 million 
(2006 dollars).  Although RCA designed the phase shifter for AEGIS, critical materials 
for the phase shifter were procured from other companies.  The garnet material was 
provided by Trans Tech who has continued to provide all of the garnet material for 
AEGIS production.   
 Assembly of the phase shifter has always been a significant challenge due to the 
sensitive nature of the material interactions between the garnet material, the aluminum 
housing, and ancillary RF and logic control wire interfaces.  A highly skilled assembly 
team using advanced manufacturing process control techniques has continually managed 
this process closely to provide the high yields necessary to achieve the demanding cost 
requirements.  
C. NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR SPY-1B 
 Although the AEGIS SPY-1A radar was a huge success, the Navy continued to 
push RCA throughout the 1980's to improve phase-shifter insertion loss, bit-phase 
shifting, and differential phase error—ultimately reducing sidelobe levels (Figure 12).  
Low sidelobes were among the highest priorities for several reasons: reduction of radar 
and communications intercept probability, reduction of radar clutter and jammer 
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vulnerability, and increasing spectrum congestion in satellite transmissions (Lockheed 
Martin, 2006).  The big challenge for RCA was how to meet the Navy's new performance 









                                 
 
Figure 12.   Depiction of Main Beam-sidelobe relation 
(Source: After Radar Tutorial, 2006) 
  
 Differential Phase Error is the root-mean-square (rms) phase-shift error due to 
variations with frequency, phase state, power, and temperature.  When considering a 
large number of phase shifters (4500 in one array), the calculation of this error may 
include variations from unit to unit.  Phase error reduces the antenna gain in a 
transmitting array and raises sidelobes in a receiving array.  The rms phase error 
permissible for the SPY-1A phase shifter was  5.8 deg rms (Lockheed Martin, 2006).   
 The Navy's new differential phase error performance parameter for SPY-1B was 
 2.1 deg rms (Lockheed Martin, 2006).  This was a 64% improvement requirement over 
the SPY-1A.  In order to achieve these numbers, RCA had to make one major 
modification and one major trade-off—increase phase-shifter bit capacity, and allow 
more insertion loss.     
 Digital (bit) Phase Shifters offer greater speed of operation and ease in interface 
with control computers.  The number of bits needed is determined by the radar design 
requirements—in particular, the number of radiating elements, element spacing, and the 
scan-angle increment.  Typical phased arrays generally use 3 or 4-bit phase shifters 
(Figure 13) as a compromise between cost, size, and system performance.  SPY-1A used 
Sidelobes 
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a 4-bit design.  However, up to 8-bit phase shifters have been used for applications that 
demand very low sidelobes with fewer number of antenna elements.  In an effort to 
improve performance while maintaining lower costs, RCA decided to use 6 bits with the 
SPY-1B. 
 
                                    
 
Figure 13.   A 3-bit Phase Shifter 
Note: The illustration shows the basic delays each phase shifter can introduce.  A central computer 
calculates the proper phase delay for each of the radiating elements and switches in the appropriate 
combination of phase-shifter pathways.  The cables delay the wave, thereby shifting the relative 
phase of the output.  (Source: From Radar Tutorial, 2006) 
 
 Insertion loss should be as low as possible.  In the transmitter mode, insertion loss 
in the phase shifter results in loss of transmitter power and heating of the phase shifter 
due to power dissipation.  In the receiver mode, it results in lowering the signal-to-noise-
ratio.  The max insertion loss permissible in the SPY-1A phase shifter was  1.15 dB at 
the high and low test frequencies,  0.85 dB everywhere else (Lockheed Martin, 2006).  
RCA's max insertion loss permissible for SPY-1B was  1.45 dB at the high and low test 
frequencies,  1.35 dB everywhere else (Lockheed Martin, 2006).  This was 26% and 
59%—respectively, more insertion loss allowable over the SPY-1A.       
 The end result was Baseline 3, which included the lighter AN/SPY-1B radar—a 
system that provided a significant improvement in the detection capabilities of the 
AEGIS Weapons System.  This radar incorporated significant advances over the earlier 
SPY-1A radar with the improved radiating characteristics, new AN/UYQ-21 consoles, 
and lower sidelobes—increasing its resistance to enemy Electronic Countermeasures 
(ECM).  Additionally, with the SPY-1B radar and the ship's MK 99 Fire-control System, 
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the ship could guide its Standard Missile to intercept hostile aircraft and missiles at 
extended ranges.   
 The SPY-1B phase shifter was as big a breakthrough as was the SPY-1A in that 
RCA was able to increase phase-shifter performance by leaps and bounds for the next 
generation of radars, yet do it without increasing the average unit procurement costs.  
CG-59 was the Navy's first cruiser equipped with the SPY-1B radar system (Figure 14). 
 
                
Figure 14.   Comparison of SPY-1B (above) vs. SPY-1A (below) 
(Source: Used with Permission from Lockheed Martin, 2006) 
 
1. Ferrite vs. Diode: RCA Wins AEGIS Destroyer Contract 
 In the 1980s, when RCA was working on the next generation of the AN/SPY-1B 
Radar for the Navy's new AEGIS Destroyer program, it found itself in competition with 
Hughes Corporation.  Hughes proposed an alternate approach using semiconductor diode 
components.  Production costs of a diode phase shifter was less than that of a garnet unit 
because the diode phase shifter was amenable to mass production and printed circuit 
techniques, whereas the garnet phase shifter required highly skilled labor.  Therefore, 
Hughes entered into fierce competition with RCA for the DDG-51 Class AEGIS 
Weapons System contract (Lockheed Martin, 2006).  However, although garnet was more 
expensive to produce, RCA proved to the Navy that garnet phase shifters were clearly the 
best value. 
 Due to their large variations in reliability, the choice of a garnet or diode phase 
shifter had a major effect on not only the antenna design but on the radar.  The garnet 
phase shifter basically has no failure mechanisms.  Most of the reliability considerations 
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for a garnet phase shifter are related to the driver.  The diode phase shifter is subject to 
diode burnout and failure mechanisms in both the phase shifter and the driver.  
Additionally, the type of phase shifter used and the manner of its use is of more 
importance in the very low-sidelobe phased-array antennas required by the Navy.  In 
most cases, the diode is either in or exceedingly close to the radiation element and subject 
to any electromagnetic pulse (EMP) impinging on the aperture.  During the Cold War, 
this proximity was particularly important if nuclear effects were part of the operation 
environment (Billetter, 1989).  Unless radiation-hardened diodes were used or the phase 
shifter was isolated from the EMP, there is a high likelihood that the diodes may burn up.   
 In 1984, RCA won the $233 million SPY-1B government contract (Reuters, 
1984).  RCA's “best value” pitch proved its worth.  To date, 23 years—76 AEGIS 
capable US Cruisers and Destroyers later—a garnet phase shifter has never been replaced 
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III. SPY-1B/D PRODUCTION IMPROVEMENT PROCESSES (PIP) 
A. BACKGROUND 
 Since 1984, there have been many process improvement initiatives to improve 
process yield and to reduce touch labor of the SPY-1B/D phase shifter.  This chapter will 
discuss some of the more important initiatives and their impact on the APUC.  Although 
this is probably the most important chapter of the case study, it lacks substantial 
quantitative cost data. The research visit at LMCO-Moorestown was very productive, 
found personnel accommodating, management was very friendly; employees even made 
time to show the researcher around the facility.  However, it was difficult for LMCO, in 
our research efforts, to ascertain detailed quantitative cost data in specific areas that 
improved process yield and reduced touch labor.  Therefore, this chapter provides only 
some very general graphs, some of which are incomplete.  Yet, though these graphs may 
be incomplete, they still provide a good overarching snap-shot to illustrate the impact of 
process yield and touch labor on costs.    
 The first chart (Figure 15) shows how LMCO-Moorestown brought the APUC of 
a phase shifter from $200 in 1984 down to almost $100 in 2002.  The APUC for phase 
shifter in 2006 is now $80 ($1.44 million per ship-set).  If we convert the $200 APUC in 
1984 to 2006 dollars, we get $5.91 million per ship-set.  After the conversion to 2006, we 
can see a substantial reduction in APUC of $4.47 million (76%)—a sizable cost reduction 
considering this is a single part in one system on an AEGIS equipped ship.   
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Production Volume (SPY Ship Sets) Phase Shifter Cost  
Figure 15.   Phase Shifter Cost per Unit 
(Source: Used with Permission from Lockheed Martin, 2006) 
 
B. PROCESS YIELD 
1. Defect and Scrap Reduction 
 Scrap generation and defect production are important conditions when evaluating 
a company’s performance. LMCO-Moorestown established a program in 1991 to both 
measure and reduce these parameters.  For scrap, prior to 1991, there was a limited 
breakdown of collected data, and the data was not in a format that allowed meaningful 
analysis (Office of Naval Research, 1995, October).  Review of the data was led by 
Engineering Management.  However, little of the information was relayed to floor 










 LMCO-Moorestown has since established multifunctional teams in each work 
center.  Each team brainstorms a list of metrics for the work center that are monitored, 
including defects and scrap.  Performance is then measured against the metrics weekly.  
An important aspect of this effort includes the linking of the company suggestion 
program to team efforts and performance.   
 Benefits have been demonstrated throughout the company.  For example, phase-
shifter defect yield of a hoped-for 80% in the 1970s improved to 99.5% in 2006 
(Lockheed Martin, 2006).  Scrap costs have been reduced by 60% from 1994 through 
2006 (Figure 16).  In addition, this approach has yielded intangible benefits, such as 
improved problem solving and corrective action skills, increased sense of ownership by 
the team, lower costs, higher quality, and a more educated workforce.   



























Figure 16.   Phase Shifter Historical Scrap Trend 1994-2006 
(Source: Used with Permission from Lockheed Martin, 2006) 
 
2. Type K/Blue- and Orange-stripe Phase Shifters 
 Type K/Blue- and Orange-stripe Phase Shifters are phase shifters with suspect 
loss or phase characteristics as determined during testing.  However, in an effort to 
reduce scrap, other uses for these phase shifters have been realized.  Specifically: 
 
x Type K.  Type Ks are phase shifters with acceptable Voltage Standing 
Wave Ratio (VSWR).  The performance of the other parameters is irrelevant.  300 
Type Ks go into every antenna, 150 in each upper corner.  They are terminated 
and not hooked up to any driver circuit; hence, the phase characteristics are 
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inconsequential because the unit isn’t shifted.  The loss characteristics are 
inconsequential as well, because there’s no RF connection. 
 The side-lobe blanker (SLB) units are “buried” in amongst the Type Ks.  
Without going into array physics, the arrangement provides better SLB 
performance by, in effect, making the SLB element look as if it’s in an infinite 
array.  This makes things work better and with more clarity.  The mutual coupling 
between the SLB and the Ks makes that happen.  For that reason, the only 
concern is VSWR, which, if too high would result in unwanted reflections 
between the elements. 
 The SPY-1B array was designed for these units.  When there is not enough 
units that have suspect loss or phase characteristics, normal “in-specification” 
units are used.  
 
x Blue Stripe.  Sometime in the mid 1980s, LMCO had a large number of 
units come through with excessive differential phase error.  Analysis showed that 
units with differential phase error between 2.1 and 2.8 deg rms at any frequency 
still had limited use (marked with a blue stripe), 2.1 deg rms being the high limit 
for "in-spec" phase shifters (unmarked).   
 Differential phase error directly influences sidelobes; therefore, using 
units with high differential phase error could result in a non-compliant array.  
LMCO built an array with 25% Blue Stripes to demonstrate their usefulness.  
LMCO changed the specification, and now allow up to 25% of the phase shifters 
in an array to be Blue Stripes, again reducing scrap and improving process yield.  
LMCO’s simulations showed that this would still allow sufficient margin in array 
side-lobe performance to accommodate any other variations that might arise in 
production.   
 The term “Blue Stripe” comes from the way the units are marked and 
identified after testing. 
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x Orange Stripe.  Orange-stripe phase shifters have higher insertion loss 
than “in-spec” units.  The average loss spec is 1.45 dB at the high and low test 
frequencies, 1.35 dB everywhere else.  The Orange Stripe units are allowed an 
insertion loss of up to 1.75 dB at the high frequency.  Increased loss affects gain.  
A higher variation in loss, as one would see when blending in units with higher 
loss than normal, increases side-lobe levels.  For these and other reasons, Orange 
Stripes are only used around the periphery of the antenna, where they have the 
least impact on performance. 
 Orange Stripes came about in 2003 when the phase shifters started to show 
excessive loss at the high end of the frequency band.  LMCO found that the 
antenna could tolerate them in limited quantities.   
 The Orange Stripe idea was a variation on the Blue Stripe.  The testers 
were already used to the idea of marking some of the units.  Making an additional 
color category was a natural fit. 
3. Replacing Green Epoxy with UV Acrylic 
 Green epoxy was originally used to hold two irises in place inside the phase-
shifter housing.  However, there was concern because the iris would occasionally 
dislodge from the garnet during testing, rendering the phase shifter scrap (Figure 17).  
The iris is highly important because it functions as a tuning element in the waveguide 
cavity. 
 As a remedy, and as a defect yield and cost reduction improvement, LMCO-
Moorestown changed from the green epoxy to a UV, acrylic material.  The UV acrylic is 
less expensive and provides more flexibility to prevent the iris from dislodging.  Not only 
did this reduce defect yield, but it also reduced cycle-time.  Additionally, the green epoxy 
required 24 hours to cure; the UV acrylic literally takes seconds.  The UV acrylic is an 
adhesive applied to the sides of the garnet, cured by a 60-second exposure to UV 
radiation in a UV-cure chamber.   
 In addition to the UV-cured adhesive applied to hold on the iris, LMCO also 
implemented an employee suggestion of another defect yield reducing process.  The 
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suggestion was to apply the adhesive to the end of the garnet at the same time it was 
applied to the sides to act as a protective coating to prevent bench-handling chips.     
                           
Figure 17.   Phase Shifter Showing Garnet/Iris Relation 
(Source Used with Permission: from Lockheed Martin, 2006) 
 
C. TOUCH-LABOR 
 Changes in the defense environment since the mid-1980s affected most 
Government contractors.  In 1989, LMCO-Moorestown responded to changes by 
abolishing thousands of positions.  However, the Local 106 union moved to team with 
LMCO in a partnership as both sides realized they had to work together to remain a 
viable business.  This initiative demonstrated LMCO’s determination to maintain a level 
workforce.  LMCO listened to new ideas, facilitated implementation, and opened lines of 
communication.  Aggressive goals were set—and exceeded—such as reducing touch 
labor by 26%.  By implementing the initiative, what was scheduled to become additional 
outsourced work on components for the AEGIS system translated into the retention of 
400 labor positions planned for elimination (Office of Naval Research, 1995, October).  
Today, touch labor is down by 40% in phase shifters alone (Figure 18).  The remainder of 
this Chapter discusses some of the larger contributors to reducing touch labor of phase 
shifters since 1990. 




Figure 18.   Phase Shifter Touch Labor Rate History 1990-2006 
(Source: Used with Permission from Lockheed Martin, 2006) 
 
1. UV Acrylic Cure Process 
 The UV acrylic process was previously discussed in the process yield section, 
however, because of reductions in touch labor, it warrants further discussion.  The iris 
epoxy cure process was labor intensive prior to the introduction of the UV acrylic.  The 
epoxy was a two-part adhesive that required one operator 16 hours a week to mix enough 
material for one week's production of phase shifters.  Additionally, the two-part epoxy 
was time-sensitive once mixed; so, material that didn't get used expired rapidly.  The UV 
acrylic is a one-part material which is dispensed directly from the manufacturer's 
container and has a greater shelf life.   
 The UV cure machine required for the new acrylic material was obtained in the 
early to mid-1990s.  The early version of the process was a belt-driven machine that 
cured one garnet at a time in 60 seconds.  The process was later optimized in the early 
2000s when a curing chamber was introduced that cures 10 garnets at a time in 60 
seconds. Thus, touch labor as well as cycle-time were reduced.     
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2. Automated Sylgard Machine 
 Sylgard is a dielectric potting material that gets pumped into the core of the phase 
shifter (Figure 19).  It displaces all air between the garnet core and the latch wire—
providing an adhesive-like filler to keep out moisture and keep the garnet from vibrating 
and affecting phase-shifter performance.  
 In this process, an operator spends 3 hours a day mixing a two-part material 
which then has to be loaded into the pumping machine. This machine then pumps it into 
the phase-shifter housing.  The mixed material has a one-hour shelf life; therefore, it must 
be used almost immediately.  Since the material is manually mixed, usually one-third of it 
ends up waste.   
 In 2002, a process improvement introduced automation to the mixing process.  A 
machine mixes the two parts on-demand, resulting in no waste and no shelf life.  
Additionally, the material is fresher and more consistent.  The new process eliminated the 
3-hour mixing operation and cut the dispensing effort by 50%.  Before, an operator had to 
prep the pumping machine with the potting material; now, the machine mixes and pumps 
it directly into the phase shifter.     
                      
Figure 19.   Cross-section of a Ferrite Core 







 Phase shifter assembly operations are difficult and labor intensive in high 
volumes (such as the 18,000 units required per ship-set).  The fragile garnet interior 
component can be easily scratched or chipped, resulting in scrapping of the assembly.  
The phase shifter requires repeatable assembly to comply with strict specifications which 
ensure microwave performance characteristics.  LMCO-Moorestown automated this 
process with robotics, thus significantly reducing touch labor. 
 The automation involves three work-cells consisting of Seiko D-TRAN robots 
which use programmable logic to simultaneously perform multiple and complex tasks. 
The first work-cell is used to pick and place 0.045-inch eyelets and ground contact 
springs to the phase-shifter housing.  The assembly then goes to the second work-cell, 
where four rivets are placed onto the housing.  The work-cell then spreads the tubular 
housing just below its elastic limit and inserts the fragile garnet assembly into the housing 
to within +0.002-inch in all directions.  The housing is then closed while the robot holds 
the garnet assembly.  The third work-cell automatically feeds a sub-miniature, A-sized 
coaxial connector, bends the microwave-sensitive probe precisely five degrees, and 
attaches the connector to the assembly using a patented Room Temperature Vulcanizing 
Silicon Encapsulate wetting method.  The connector is placed over four rivets, and finally 
riveted into place to ensure no microwave leakage.   
 The automation of the phase-shifter assembly has had many advantages.  Two 
shift operations are now performed during a single shift with one operator for each of 
these operations.  The automation is reliable enough to free these operators to perform 
quality checks and chart statistical process control (SPC) data while the automated 
assembly operation is performed.  This has resulted in an over 60% reduction in touch 
labor (Lockheed Martin, 2006).  Additionally, the manual process variations and damage 
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IV. OTHER PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS AFFECTING 
PRODUCTION 
A. CONSOLODATED PURCHASING 
 In the past, each individual business unit of LMCO-Moorestown maintained and 
operated a complete and independent purchasing department.  Few common practices 
spanned across these units, resulting in inconsistent sourcing and quality practices.  
Opportunities for increased buying efficiencies and overall cost effectiveness were often 
lost.  Multiple organizations increased the number of suppliers as well as variation in the 
products.  Lockheed Martin resolved this situation by consolidating the business units 
into three purchasing organizations, one of which is the Material Acquisition Center Mid-
Atlantic Region (MAC-MAR). 
 MAC-MAR provides full-service sourcing for Lockheed Martin and some non-
Lockheed Martin companies.  The sourcing services include direct major subcontracting 
and indirect buying, supplier management, technology engineering, receiving, supplier 
quality assurance, inspection, freight management and cost estimating.  The role of 
MAC-MAR goes beyond basic research; it also includes new development through 
production, and lifetime support after the product reaches the market.  In addition, MAC-
MAR actively participates in the shared corporate goals of Lockheed Martin such as the 
Six Sigma Program.  Consolidation is also making it possible to do more within the 
Lockheed Martin acquisition community, such as technology road-mapping, instigating a 
global supplier base and systems integration. 
 Additional services and buying centers have been developed over time to include 
material cost estimating, field quality, freight-in, assessments, and subcontract agents.  
Commodity, indirect, and IT buying centers have also merged, in which MAC-MAR 
implemented an automated buying process. A consolidated purchasing approach provides 
tremendous leverage with suppliers while greatly reducing the cost of doing business.  
MAC-MAR improved total manpower productivity by 26.4% in its first 4 years, 
improved material quality by 128%, obtained the highest buyer productivity in LMCO, 
and reduced overall procurement costs by 32% (Office of Naval Research, 2001, 
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August).  The administrative surcharge alone on acquisition services dropped from 10% 
in the early 1990s to 5% in 2000. 
B. SUPPLIER PROCESS SURVEILLANCE 
 Previously, LMCO-Moorestown used traditional supplier product acceptance 
methods which relied on costly inspections upon receipt or at the supplier's location.  
Despite large numbers of dedicated inspection personnel, the company could not fully 
protect its assembly operations from process-related product anomalies.  In 1999, MAC-
MAR implemented Supplier Process Surveillance (SPS) which shifted the emphasis of 
quality from inspections to process controls (Office of Naval Research, 2001, August). 
 Supplier eligibility for the program is an active status with open purchase orders, 
sufficient parts quantities, and work in processes (WIPs).  The first step of SPS is the 
creation of a Technical Data Package (TDP), which is a team effort by the technical 
specialist, technical engineer, and supplier.  The TDP is used to baseline the supplier and 
takes about two months to complete.  As a minimum, the package contains a process 
map, a surveillance plan, critical process identification, process indicator points (if 
applicable), and a surveillance schedule (which is a table of process checklists).  
Minimum requirements are determined by supplier category (e.g., manufacturer and 
distributor, manufacturer only, distributor only, and manufacturer of custom parts).  
Reviews are predetermined by the TDP team. 
 The technical specialist performs the checklists according to schedule. Review 
results are then forwarded to the technical engineer and maintained in the Supplier 
Quality System.  If anomalies are found, corrective action is requested, and the supplier's 
quality rating is affected.  The technical specialist communicates with various parties and 
visits the suppliers as necessary.  After a three-month period, suppliers with good quality 
ratings may be evaluated for MAC-MAR's Dock-to-stock Program.  Once approved, this 
qualification eliminates incoming inspections and shifts the burden to supplier process 
controls.  Evaluation criteria include quality rating, corrective action status, trend 
analysis, critical process assessment, and an approved quality system.  A Risk Review 
Board meeting is held to review supplier nominations.  The Board consists of a Defense 
Contractor Management Agency representative, a quality-management supplier, a 
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technical engineer, and an SPS administrator.  During these meetings, the Board can vote 
suppliers into a Dock-to-stock status. 
 SPS promotes predictable quality performance and efficient supplier oversight, 
thereby developing supplier process improvement and securing a high performance 
supplier base.  Currently, over 250 suppliers are in the program (Lockheed Martin, 2006). 
C. EIGHT-STEP PROCESS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM 
 In the past, Lockheed Martin used traditional approaches (e.g., production 
readiness reviews, qualifications prior to production, etc.) for supplier quality 
management and development.  During production, a reactive system monitored the 
supplier's quality performance and implemented corrective measures after trends were 
identified.  Although somewhat effective, the company did not study the processes in 
detail nor optimize the opportunities for making improvements. Readiness reviews often 
lacked the thoroughness required to study in-depth process flows and preparedness for 
new/revised products introduced into the system.  Reactive systems required fixes after 
significant damage had already been done—typically impacting product cost, quality, and 
delivery at a much higher level than if adverse conditions were corrected early in the 
production cycle.  Seeing an opportunity for continuous improvement, MAC-MAR 
implemented the Eight-step Process improvement Program in 1998. 
 The Eight-step Process Improvement Program follows a detailed process flow that 
focuses on critical suppliers, materials, and processes; uses analytical tools to identify 
supplier trends; identifies critical manufacturing and/or part processes; and employs 
process surveillance to monitor risk areas.  With the help of input by the business units, 
key suppliers are selected for review under the program.  MAC-MAR assigns a lead 
engineer to facilitate a team of three to six people for each supplier, which then sets the 
eight-step process into motion.  Team composition is personnel from other business units 
who have expertise in the products/processes related to the product to be delivered.  The 
team uses various purchasing and performance databases to develop Pareto Analysis 
charts for review, and has access to the supplier to document, review, and analyze 
process flows.  From these analyses and reviews, the team develops supplier action plans 
and requirements.  The supplier makes the prescribed changes, and the team monitors the 
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performance.  The combined progress of all the suppliers selected for the program is then 
charted to reveal the total impact of the Eight-step Process Improvement Program. 
 By 2001, 96% of the 59 key suppliers showed performance improvement, all 
impacting various degrees of quality, cost, and delivery of their products to Lockheed 
Martin (Office of Naval Research, 2001, August).  The Eight-step Process Improvement 
Program is part of a powerful suite of tools and techniques employed by MAC-MAR to 
improve supplier performance. 
D. LEAN AND SIX SIGMA 
 Six Sigma deployment and Lean integration has been an evolutionary process at 
LMCO-Moorestown. The company utilized a manufacturing process focus up through 
1998, a design focus in 1999, and a business processes focus in the early 2000s (Office of 
Naval Research, 2003, April).  The Quality, Ethics and Mission Success Organization 
developed the strategy, implemented the plan, and coordinated the driving change across 
the business. Today, Lean and Six Sigma is a structured process improvement 
methodology that significantly increases the involvement and effectiveness of employees 
in improving the systems they use to perform their work. 
 LMCO identified several key roles in pulling the Lean and Six Sigma 
methodology together, and it starts from the top.  Figure 20 shows the overview of the 
process.  A Senior Leadership Team (SLT) of top executives provides visible support 
through programs and resources to drive overall change throughout the organization.  
Functional organizations select Management Points of Contact to be the focal point of 
Lean and Six Sigma (e.g., project measurements, performance, results) in their areas.  
These individuals manage and focus resources, concurrent with identifying key project 
opportunities.  The company also uses Master Black Belts (MBBs), full-time employees 
who have significant experience in Six Sigma and Lean methodology, in addition to 
changing management leadership.  MBBs implement program strategy, lead projects, 
facilitate improvement events and provide training and mentoring for over 500 Black- 
and Green-belt employees trained in the Lean and Six Sigma philosophy. The key focus 
areas are: Transactional Lean and Six Sigma (which exposes sources of errors, rework, 
and non-value added steps), manufacturing Lean and Six Sigma (that prioritizes and 
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eliminates the most costly defects), and design for Six Sigma (that validates the 
availability of capability to meet customers’ needs). 
                 
Figure 20.   Process Overview   
(Source: From Lockheed Martin, 2006) 
 
 Training courses are integrated into the Lean and Six Sigma approach, including 
Leadership Awareness, Black-belt Training, and Classical and Design for Six Sigma 
Green-belt Training.  Monitoring and communicating performance are accomplished 
through project performance metrics, engaging the Financial Department upfront and 
through monthly project performance reviews.  Other elements are communication and 
recognition.  Communication vehicles include pamphlets, business reviews, newsletters, 
roundtables, and intranet web sites.  Recognition and rewards include plaques, 
certificates, monetary awards, and giveaway items (e.g., mugs, jackets, shirts). 
 The return on investment of Lean and Six Sigma techniques is directly 
proportional to the commitment of business leadership.  These techniques aid LMCO in 
providing effective tools to actively identify waste (i.e., defects and labor hours) and 
remove it from work processes.  After waste is removed, techniques for sustaining 
improved performance are implemented. 
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E. PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS 
 In the early 1990s, LMCO defined a need to continuously improve its existing 
processes.  Typically, these efforts were undertaken as a reactive approach to resolve 
production or quality issues.  Increasing competitive demands and tightening shop 
budgets drove the need for a more structured approach.  In 1998, the company developed 
goals for a refined and revitalized approach with a focus on proactive-driven 
improvements and cost reductions. 
 The Productivity Improvement Projects include renewed planning, improved 
reporting structure, and better capture of improvements versus baseline.  The approach 
engages the company's strong experience base, with the Technical Support Team and 
Operations Management initiating and facilitating brainstorming sessions in selected 
Micro Businesses. The initial step involved prioritizing the Micro Businesses and 
systematically working through the list using multi-functional teams to focus on non-
value added operations, rework, and scrap.  The company also developed a process flow 
to facilitate the new approach (Figure 21), and a comprehensive database to support the 
entire operation from initiation to benefits tracking.  These Productivity Improvement 
Projects take advantage of tools and concepts offered by Lean and Six Sigma. 
 
Figure 21.   Process Flow 
(Source: From Lockheed Martin, 2006) 
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 Since 1998, more than 100 project ideas have been captured by LMCO.  Some of 
Lockheed Martin's most significant projects include Tin/Lead Plating Elimination on 
Phase-shifter Connectors, Elimination of Epoxy Staking on Power Divider Assembly 
Connectors and Development of Push-on Combiner Test Connectors. 
F. EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION PROGRAM 
 In 1991, a formal employee suggestion process was implemented as part of a 
major effort to help reduce costs and improve products, safety, quality, facilities, 
operations, and sales.  This process was the typical paper-based system suggestion box 
that required manual handling for collecting, evaluating, and tracking employee 
suggestions.  Looking for a new approach, LMCO implemented a web-based Employee 
Suggestion Program in January 2001. 
 The Employee Suggestion Program features a Suggestion Tracking System that 
operates as a comprehensive tool for inputting, storing, evaluating, and communicating 
suggestions throughout the organization.  Suggestors can submit their ideas on-line as 
individuals, co-suggestors, or in teams.  The Suggestion Tracking System facilitates ease 
in submitting ideas via a fill-in-the-blank electronic format.  The system automatically 
generates e-mail to notify the various the cog departments.  The goal of the Employee 
Suggestion Program is to answer each suggestion quickly, fairly, and accurately.  Once a 
suggestion is initially evaluated and selected, it goes to a Suggestion Review Board 
comprised of cross-functional members—including management and union 
representatives.  Every suggestion receives feedback of disposition and an explanation of 
the evaluation decision.  Successfully implemented ideas can earn an award of 25% of 
the first-year savings for a team effort or 15% for an individual effort.   
 The Employee Suggestion Program's comprehensive tracking system takes 
advantage of the company's intranet to ensure the accuracy of the data without limiting 




Figure 22.   Employee Suggestion Program Cumulative Savings 1992-2005 
(Source: Used with Permission from Lockheed Martin, 2006) 
 
G. ENGINEERING CHANGE NOTICE 
 In the mid 1990s, LMCO-Moorestown converted its engineering change notice 
(ECN) process from a manual, labor-intensive, paper process to an automated, computer-
based process.  These changes allowed the company to better track the flow of an ECN 
and reduce its approval cycle.  In the late 1990s, Lockheed Martin further refined this 
process by creating the Automated ECN/Problem Sheet System, an electronic workflow 
tool for creating, reviewing, and tracking engineering changes and manufacturing issues 
in the design and manufacturing environment. 
 ECNs are formal mechanisms for revising released engineering drawings. 
Problem sheets are formal mechanisms for documenting issues with engineering or 
process documentation.  Lockheed Martin wanted to tie together the databases of these 
related, but separate, mechanisms. The goal was to replace the paper process across 
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various organizations with a single electronic process and to streamline the review and 
approval process.  As a result, the company developed a common tool for creating 
documentation that still met the varying needs of its numerous users. 
 The Automated ECN/Problem Sheet System provides Lockheed Martin with an 
automated tool for creating, processing, and monitoring ECNs and problem sheets in the 
program management office, engineering, manufacturing, and sourcing departments.  
Standard and custom review screens give employees the ability to develop meaningful 
metrics of their processes.  In 2005, more than 2,154 documents were processed under 
this system.  The company also significantly reduced its total cycle-time (problem sheet 
investigation, analysis, ECN generation, and approval). 
1. Engineering Change Notice Reduction 
 To improve its overall design process, Lockheed Martin needed a way to provide 
better visibility into the causes of Engineering Change Notices (ECNs).  In addition, no 
method existed to prevent ECNs from recurring.  To address these issues, the company 
implemented the ECN Review Board (ERB). 
 The ERB is comprised of Configuration MGT, Quality Assurance, MFG Eng, 
Producibility, and Operations Material Release.  Meetings are held three times per week, 
and typically two to three additional individuals at random are invited to observe the 
process.  At these meetings, the Board evaluates and categorizes all digital hardware 
ECNs, performs root-cause analysis on preventable ECNs, and identifies and incorporates 
process/tool/training corrective actions. 
 Engineers originating an ECN present the root cause and corrective action to the 
ERB.  The Board can either approve or disapprove the action.  If the Board disagrees 
with the recommendation, the engineer is given an opportunity to defend the proposed 
corrective action.  The Board review is repeated until all parties agree on the suggested 
corrective action.  At that time, the ERB assigns individuals to map the processes and to 
determine the costs associated with implementing the corrective action.  At the next 
meeting, the responsible individuals present their reports to the Board which, in turn, 
adopts a corrective action.  To prevent ECNs from recurring, a database tracking process 
is used.  
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 Additional benefits include improved design practices and tools, and a reduction 
in ECNs, rework, and cycle-time.  Since implementing the ERB, Lockheed Martin 













 V.  AEGIS WEAPON SYSTEM CONTRACTS 
A. INRODUCTION 
 This chapter identifies contracting influences and forces that may have had both 
direct and indirect influence over the AEGIS phase-shifter production improvements and 
R-TOC.  These influences may have driven performance by LMCO, which in turn 
yielded process improvements, reductions in cost to the government, and increased 
phase-shifter reliability and producibility.   
 This chapter is by no means an exhaustive or all-inclusive study of the contracting 
arrangements for phase-shifter production or the correlation of contracting influences and 
specific results.  It will describe the AEGIS weapon system contracts and the relation to 
phase-shifter production.  The intent is to show any correlation between the appropriate 
use of contracting processes and the superior performance by LMCO that led to 
successful program outcomes. 
B. CONTRACTS 
 The AEGIS Weapon System (AWS) contracts are production contracts that cover 
thousands of parts required to build the SPY radar systems, i.e., auxiliary equipment, 
support and test equipment, and equipment spares.  The phase shifter, like all the other 
items, is a piece-part produced under the terms of the LMCO AWS production contract; 
therefore, phase-shifter specific incentives data was not readily available and would have 
required extensive collection efforts and complex analysis beyond the scope of this 
project.  Since LMCO was only able to produce limited production contract data, only 
general correlations and conclusions may be drawn regarding direct effects on phase-
shifter cost reductions.  
1. Contract Type 
 All production contracts for the AWS that were identified and studied have been 
Fixed-price Incentive (FPI) contracts.  This fact is aligned with the criteria for use 
described in Chapter one.  The AWS is a mature system consisting of proven 
technologies.  There is a decreased amount of risk to LMCO due to the history of work to 
produce and manufacture this system.  This contract type allows LMCO to perform 
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contract requirements with an acceptable amount of risk and incentive, contrary to formal 
incentives discussed in the next paragraph, to increase profits by lowering costs and 
improving processes.  This feature is inherent to the fixed-price arrangement because 
every dollar LMCO saves in costs is a dollar transformed into profit. 
2. Incentive Structure 
 The incentive structure is a formula based incentive that includes a 50/50 cost and 
savings sharing ratio between the Government and LMCO.  The contract requirements 
lend themselves to this incentive arrangement due to the ability to measure performance 
objectively.  This requirement would not require the utility or flexibility of an award fee 
arrangement due to the low variation inherent in a high-volume production or 
manufacturing operation of a developed technology.  The costs of a burdensome 
administrative and contract management effort would most likely outweigh the potential 
benefit derived from any increases in superior performance which may be produced by 
the award-fee incentive. 
3. Contract Type and Incentive Results 
 By all accounts, the FPIF arrangement has had a significant influence on LMCO 
performance.  This study has highlighted many of these reductions in cost and increases 
in product quality in previous chapters.  LMCO sources have made direct reference to the 
sharing aspect of the FPIF contract as a motivating factor in contractor performance.  One 
employee remarked, “The 50/50 share line on the contract pushes us to constantly search 
to find new ways to improve processes, decrease costs, and improve the product.” 
 While our research does not provide empirical data to prove significant 
correlation between the program successes and the contracting type or incentive 
influences, it does provide a framework and basis from which to draw conclusions about 
the potential for these practices to produce such results.  The next section certainly 
illustrates the need for similar and more detailed research.  The combination of the right 
contract type with an appropriate incentive structure work in concert to create a program 
landscape that has appropriate levels of risk for the Government and contractor and 
includes ample opportunity for mutual benefit. Such a balanced relationship leads to 
superior contract performance by the contractor. 
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C. PROGRAM INVESTMENTS AND SAVINGS 
 Contract incentives are not the only methods by which to increase program 
success or reduce costs.  Contract specific investments are another way to create savings 
and inject improvements.  Changes to the program, processes, or product through formal 
contract modifications and obligation of additional funding can result in significant 
savings from improved processes, reductions in cycle-time and lower production or 
manufacturing costs.  LMCO has produced savings for the Government through a 
number of affordability initiatives on AWS contracts (Lockheed Martin, 2006).   
 Although no specific phase-shifter affordability investments could be identified, 
below are two examples of affordability investments made on AWS contracts that 
resulted in savings:   
 
x The flexible phased-stable cables in the array columns were replaced with semi-
rigid copper-outer-conductor cables (“Hardlines”) of equivalent electrical length.  
This change is primarily to realize a cost savings, although marginal performance 
improvements are also realized. 
o Government Non-recurring Engineering (NRE) investment of $1,602,000. 
o Savings realized per hull of $2,141,000. 
o Cut-in hull of DDG-83. 
 
x Phase-shifter driver DMS resolution redesign using Commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) parts. 
o Government NRE cost of $3,600,000. 
o Savings per hull of $2,350,000. 
o Cut-in hull of DDG-111. 
 
 Reviewing these investments and understanding the magnitude of the net benefit 
makes it apparent that they are a worthy effort and can save the Government a great 
number of taxpayer dollars. Additionally, contractors would be encouraged and 
motivated to find opportunities for and make such investments on their own when 
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appropriate and sufficient contract incentives are utilized in the arrangement.  A share in 
some of the total savings realized by a few of these investments demonstrates the 
potential shared savings or additional profit or fee that a formula based, sharing ration 























VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 In summary, the goal of this research was to provide a case study that captured the 
production and design processes and program management solutions used to reduce total 
ownership costs of AEGIS Radar Phase Shifters. 
 The phase shifter was an AEGIS Weapon System major acquisition cost-driver 
that was reduced to a medium-priced component through design and redesign, various 
process improvement projects, and other programs that improved phase-shifter 
production either directly or indirectly. 
 Phase shifters were initially designed for LMCO-Moorestown (then RCA) for 
approximately $2000 per unit in 1974; since then, LMCO has embarked on an aggressive 
campaign to productize the phase shifter. The resultant version (SPY-1A) brought down 
the acquisition cost of one ship set by $133 million (2006 dollars)—the first giant leap 
towards R-TOC of AEGIS Radar Phase Shifters.  Shortly thereafter, the Navy sought to 
improve phase-shifter performance to reduce sidelobe levels. This was the next big 
challenge for LMCO because not only did the Navy want to improve performance, but it 
had incentivized LMCO to improve performance while concurrently keeping down the 
APUC.  The result was SPY-1B: a radar system that incorporated significant advances 
over the SPY-1A radar, with improved detection capabilities as well as lower sidelobes.  
LMCO was able to increase phase-shifter performance by leaps and bounds for the next 
generation of radars, yet do it without increasing the APUC.   
 Throughout the 1980s and ‘90s, there have been many Navy FPIF contract 
incentives; consequently, there have been many LMCO process improvement initiatives 
to improve process yield and reduce touch labor.  Through various defect- and scrap-
reduction initiatives, LMCO improved defect yield from approximately 80% in the 1970s 
to 99.5% in 2006.  It brought down touch labor by 40% between 1990 and 2006 through 
the implementation of robotics and other automation processes.  The culmination of these 
process improvements have brought the APUC of a phase shifter from $200 in 1984 
down to $80 in 2006—reducing the APUC another $4.47 million (or 76%) in 2006 
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dollars per ship set—thus, reducing costs of future acquisitions of AEGIS Weapons 
Systems.   
 LMCO not only worked diligently to directly improve its phase-shifter production 
processes, but it looked for other programs and avenues through which to lower total 
ownership costs indirectly, i.e., consolidated purchasing, lean and six sigma, productivity 
improvement projects, etc.  More specifically, the establishment of MAC-MAR improved 
manpower productivity by over 26% in its first four years and reduced overall 
procurement costs of the AEGIS program by 32%; additionally, the implementation of 
Lean and Six Sigma and the Employee Suggestion Program have further reduced costs, 
improved products, safety, quality, operations, etc. 
 In conclusion, as a system progresses from early concept through prototyping, 
into production, and finally reaches the sustainment phase, the opportunities to 
significantly reduce Total Ownership Cost diminish.  This clearly indicates that R-TOC 
efforts are most effective early in the developmental cycle where changes are least 
expensive and easiest to implement.  However, TOC reductions can be effective 
throughout the system’s lifecycle.  The balance between capabilities and affordability 
means that more warfighting assets are available to the warfighter.  TOC stakeholders 
have a vested interest in influencing the system design and development to yield a 
suitable, effective, and affordable solution.  The challenge is how to accomplish this goal. 
 This challenge becomes greater in today's restructured acquisition environment.  
A key to success of the Aegis TOC reduction efforts noted in this report was the single 
program management office for the entire weapons system throughout its life cycle.  
Prior to 2002, "cradle to grave" shipbuilding responsibility including research, 
development, acquisition, construction and lifecycle support resided in one program 
office under the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 
Acquisition (ASN RDA).  After 2002, as part of the realignment under ASN RDA, 5 new 
Program Executive Offices (PEOs) were created—Ships, Carriers, Submarines, Littoral 
and Mine Warfare, and Integrated Warfare Systems (IWS).  This restructuring effectively 
terminated the unique management structure of Aegis which enabled major TOC 
reductions..  As a result, the individual Weapon Systems acquisitions for all ship classes 
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now fall under one umbrella, PEO-IWS, while PEO-SHIPS maintains most of the 
aforementioned shipbuilding responsibilities of surface combatants.  PEO-SHIPS no 
longer has cradle to grave responsibility for the end use weapon system as a whole.  
 As one may envision, because of its size and complexity and long-term lifecycle 
requirements, separating program management (thus, ownership) of the major weapons 
acquisition function from shipbuilding may present significant challenges to major TOC 
reduction efforts for future ships.  Since the majority of lifecycle sustainment costs are 
best addressed up front, and if PEO-IWS only overseas the construction and purchase of 
the new, individual, weapon systems before passing them to PEO-SHIPS, will there be 
sufficient focus to allow down-the-road lifecycle R-TOC efforts?  Only time will tell and 
this subject is recommended for future research.  As evident in this case study, past 
successes of R-TOC of AEGIS Radar Phase Shifters are a direct result of long-term 
Program Management and Stakeholder relationships from development and acquisition 
through integration and sustainment. 
 An acquisition strategy prevalent in Aegis which enabled R-TOC efforts was 
"strategic partnering."  Strategic Partnering is a long-term, mutually beneficial business 
relationship containing specific elements unique to the relationship; it is an agreement 
detailing performance requirements and conditions, structures to promote successful 
interaction between parties, organizational alignment, clear measures of success, and a 
high level of mutual commitment.  Long-term contracts and collaboration generally foster 
lower costs due to the greater incentive to make transactional-specific investments, the 
sharing of information and value engineering with the resulting enhanced learning curves.  
This AEGIS case clearly demonstrates a compelling and undeniable example of this.  
Although limitations on contract length and competition requirements in federal 
contracting are well-founded and justified, the acquisition community needs to consider 
the many benefits possible with contracting and long-term strategic partnerships.   
 One of the more intangible benefits of strategic partnering worth mentioning in 
this report is the longevity of both government and contractor employees in a program, 
and the benefits it lends to program success by way of capturing experience and corporate 
knowledge.  For example, in the 1990s, LMCO-Moorestown established a twice-monthly 
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communications meeting to promote effective working relationships.  Critical matters 
such as material management, forward pricing rates, interim/final billing rates, and cost-
savings initiatives were resolved in a timely manner (Office of Naval Research, 1995, 
October).  The meetings also fostered open communications that built trust and 
teamwork, resulting in increased efficiency and better utilization of resources.  Today, 
LMCO-Moorestown uses Integrated Production Team's (IPTs) where issues and 
problems can be immediately resolved.  This approach results in real-time customer 
feedback and reduces the chance for misunderstanding, thereby increasing customer 
satisfaction.  These are prime examples of how government/contractor employee 
longevity contributes to the long-term success of a program (Greene, 2006).  
 LMCO's reduction of production costs, when combined with Navy FPIF contracts 
and long-term partnering, has been extremely successful in driving down phase shifter 
total ownership costs.  The production and management processes used to achieve these 
results are important to understand in light of post-Cold War defense spending cuts and 
acquisition reform. This case study both validates these successes and identifies the 
underlying factors that catalyzed them, while highlighting the vital role that Lockheed 
Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors (MS2) at Moorestown played in reducing the 
acquisition costs of past and future AEGIS Weapon Systems. 
        
 53
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Billetter, D.R. (1989). Multifunction array radar. Norwood, MA: Artech House. 
Boehm, B. (2000, February). Spiral Development: Experience, Principles, and 
Refinements. Report to the Software Engineering Institute on Spiral Development 
Experience and Implementation Challenges. CMU/SEI-2000-SR-008. 
Boudreau, M.W., & Naegle, B.R. (2003, September). Reduction of total ownership cost 
(Acquisition Research Sponsored Report Series). Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
Global Security.org. (2006). DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class pictures. Retrieved August 16, 
2006, from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ddg-51-pics.htm. 
Greene, J.B. (2006, November 28). [Interview with LCDR Wray W. Bridger & Capt 
Mark D. Ruiz]. 
Jane's.com Website. (2006). AEGIS weapon system MK-7. Retrieved September 23, 
2006, from http://www.janes.com/defence/naval_forces/news/misc/AEGIS01 
0425.shtml. 
Kaye, M.A., Sobota, M.S., Graham, D.R., & Gotwald, A.L. (2000, Fall). Cost as an 
independent variable: Principles and implementation. Acquisition Review 
Quarterly. 
Koul, S.K., & Bhat, B. (1991). Microwave and millimeter wave phase shifters. (Vol. 1). 
Norwood, MA: Artech House, 1991. 
Lockheed Martin at Moorsetown Production Managers. (2006, August 8 through 2006, 
December 10). [Interviews and Electronic Communication with LCDR Wray W. 
Bridger & Capt Mark D. Ruiz]. 
Naval-Technology.com. (2006). Arleigh Burke Class (AEGIS) guided missile destroyers, 
USA. Retrieved September 23, 2006, from http://www.naval-technology.com/ 
projects/burke.  
 54
Office of Naval Research. (1995, October). Best manufacturing practices.  Report of 
Survey conducted at Lockheed Martin Government Electronic Systems, 
Moorestown, NJ. College Park Maryland, BMP. 
Office of Naval Research. (2001, August). Best manufacturing practices.  Report of 
Survey conducted at Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics & Surveillance Systems-
Surface Systems, Moorestown, NJ. College Park Maryland, BMP. 
Office of Naval Research. (2003, April-revision). Best manufacturing practices.  Report 
of Survey conducted at Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics & Surveillance 
Systems-Surface Systems, Moorestown, NJ. August 2001. Retrieved September 
23, 2006, from http://www.bmpcoe.org/bestpractices/internal/lness/index.html. 
Radar Tutorial. Radar principles. Retrieved September 23, 2006, from 
http://www.radartutorial.eu/index.en.html#this. 
Reuters. (1984, April 25). RCA's Navy PACT. The New York Times. Retrieved 
September, 2006, from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9901E6 
D91238F936A15757C0A962948260. 
US General Accounting Office. (2003, February). Best practices: Setting requirements 
differently could reduce weapon systems' total ownership costs. Report to the 
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed 
Services, US Senate. GAO-03-57.  
US Navy. (2003, June). Operational availability handbook, A practical guide for military 
system, sub-system and equipment. OPNAVINST 3000.12A. 
USS NORTON SOUND Website. (2006). History of USS NORTON SOUND. Retreived 
September, 2006, from http://www.ussnortonsound.com/. 
Van Genderen, P. (undated). State-of-the-Art and Trends in Phased Array Radar. Delft, 
Netherlands: Delft University of Technology. 
Venable, B. T. (2000, December). Using effective contractual incentives to obtain 
superior contractor performance. Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School. 
 
 55
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Robert N. Beck 
GSBPP Naval Post Graduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Keith F. Snider 
GSBPP Naval Post Graduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5. James B. Greene 
GSBPP Naval Post Graduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
6. Bill Gates 
GSBPP Naval Post Graduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
7. Aruna Apte 
GSBPP Naval Post Graduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
8. Karey L. Shaffer 
GSBPP Naval Post Graduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
